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XUNZI’S RITUAL MODEL AND MODERN MORAL EDUCATION
Colin Joseph Lewis
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
Abstract. While the early Confucians were largely content to maintain the rituals of ancient kings as the core 
of moral education in their time, it is not obvious that contemporary humans could, or should, draw from the 
particulars of such a tradition. Indeed, even if one takes ritual seriously as a tool for cultivation, there remains 
a question of how to design moral education programs incorporating ritual. This essay examines impediments 
faced by a ritualized approach to moral education, how they might be overcome, and how a ritual method 
could be developed in modernity. I contend that a Confucian notion of ritual, particularly as elaborated in 
the Xunzi, is both compatible with modern moral education and capable of making a distinct contribution to 
moral education in terms of how rituals can be used to structure and inculcate a shared climate of respect and 
humaneness both in- and outside the classroom. Specifically, the ritual education method includes emphases 
on inculcating moral fluency via symbolic practices and distinctions, training and appropriately associating 
promoral dispositions, enhancing moral imagination, and developing awareness of other minds. The model is 
thus a multifaceted approach to moral education through (meta)cognitive development.
THE STATE OF MORAL EDUCATION
Few will dispute the importance of inculcating morality (or at least prosocial tendencies), so it is no sur-
prise that, as educational institutions evolve, so too do moral education initiatives. For example, over the 
past several decades United States schools have increasingly invested in moral and character education 
programs, generally focusing on inculcating skills and dispositions that can assist in resolving common 
conflicts among youth, ranging from sharing to drug abuse.1 The U.S. Institute of Education Sciences 
depicts this education as the influence that families, schools, and other social institutions have on the 
positive character development of children and adults, where character is understood as “the moral and 
ethical qualities of persons as well as the demonstration of those qualities in their emotional responses, 
reasoning, and behavior.”2 The programs employ a variety of methods, encompass diverse settings, and 
may be pervasive throughout a community or localized to particular classroom or extracurricular expe-
riences.
While it is unclear whether there is a consistent underlying theory or vision for what these moral 
education programs (should) look like,3 many have made at least marginal progress. Peer mediation, for 
example, is an increasingly popular program due to initial successes in promoting the (arguably moral) 
practice of conflict resolution and an overall reduction in reported conflicts over time.4 Students train to 
1 While this essay draws mainly, though not exclusively, from U.S.-based research, moral education is an international 
concern. Accordingly, I suspect that the messages conveyed herein will appeal to a broader audience.
2 “What Works Clearinghouse Evidence Review Protocol for Character Education Interventions”, https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/
Docs/ReferenceResources/CharEd_protocol.pdf, accessed 6 January 2020.
3 Thomas Lickona, “Eleven Principles of Effective Character Education”, Journal of Moral Education 25, no. 1 (1996) has 
attempted to develop an outline for principles that character education programs should look to, although it is unclear whether 
all or most programs currently in use actually subscribe to these principles as guidelines for development. James S. Leming, “Tell 
Me a Story: An evaluation of a literature-based character education programme”, Journal of Moral Education 29, no. 4 (2000), 
413–14, however, has suggested that many such programs lack even underlying theoretical bases, let alone unified designs.
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become “mediators” who help fellow students work through various personal and interpersonal conflicts. 
Additionally, several multi-year studies of more general, comprehensive moral education programs pro-
vide empirical support for the claim that such programs have a variety of positive effects on students. A 
study conducted across twenty primary schools in Hawai’i found that a program emphasizing character 
development resulted in a seventy percent reduction in suspensions, a fifteen percent reduction in absen-
teeism, and improved performance on literacy and mathematics tests.5 Another study, conducted over 
a period of twenty years at a Utah high school that folded character-building practices into academic 
lessons, also reported great success in terms of character development and academic progress by par-
ticipants.6 Such outcomes imply that moral education benefits both individual students and the school 
environment at large.
There is, then, motivation for the continued adoption of moral education programs: they can reduce 
antisocial and problematic behaviors, increase conflict resolution skills, and yield improved quality of 
coursework. Less clear is how the moral education process should proceed and what it should entail. This 
is an end to which ritual, particularly as conceptualized in the Confucian tradition, can contribute as an 
educational resource.
WHAT IS (CONFUCIAN) RITUAL?
In the Confucian tradition,7 “ritual” refers not only to special, more dramatic performances (e.g., sac-
rifices), but also to mundane practices that one might classify as etiquette (e.g., greetings and modes of 
address, general comportment in public, etc.).8 Additionally, and dissimilar from its apparent use by 
many contemporary theorists, Confucian ritual is also depicted in non-performative terms as social di-
visions that mark out distinctions of right and wrong, noble and base, and superior and subordinate.9 In 
so doing, ritual formally establishes relationships between members of the community and the behaviors 
concomitant to said relationships. It is also noteworthy that the Confucian notion of ritual is specifically 
a norm of performance. While, from an anthropological perspective, one might construe a community’s 
rituals as the way people behave in general, as opposed to (pro-)moral behavior in particular, for the 
Confucians this would be a mistake: people can certainly fail to perform according to ritual, potentially 
resulting in moral failure. It is best, then, to construe the Confucian notion of ritual as not only particular 
practices, but as a collection of prescriptions. Specifically, given the association of ritual with inculcating 
5 Frank Snyder et al., “Impact of a social-emotional and character development program on school-level indicators of 
academic achievement, absenteeism, and disciplinary outcomes: A matched-pair, cluster randomized, controlled trial”, Journal 
of research on educational effectiveness 3, no. 1 (2010).
6 David D. Williams et al., “Character Education in a Public High School: A multi-year inquiry into Unified Studies”, Journal 
of Moral Education 32, no. 1 (2003).
7 Though I write of the Confucian tradition broadly, I understand that the myriad pre-Qin and neo-Confucian texts differ on a 
number of subjects, including ritual. I do think, however, that there are at least aspects of ritual that are treated consistently across 
the early and later Confucian canons that are sufficient to compose a core conception of ritual that, and this is the notion with 
which I operate. Where appropriate, I attempt to identify distinct strands of Confucian thought and how they give rise to particular 
features of ritual or a ritual education model.
8 See also Herbert Fingarette, “Human Community as Holy Rite: An Interpretation of Confucius’ Analects”, The Harvard 
Theological Review 59, no. 1 (1966). It is important to clarify, though, that ritual is not merely etiquette. For one, as I will argue, 
ritual possesses affective and moral components that, arguably, are detached from (or at least inessential to) etiquette. Moreover, 
ritual is not reducible to the details of performance; it can be amended to better serve its moral purpose, whereas it is not clear 
that such is the case for etiquette.
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and expressing prosociality,10 I suggest construing Confucian rituals as prescriptions governing practices 
and standards that embody expressions of respect and related dispositions.11, 12
Construing Confucian ritual in this way helps to explicate its centrality to moral education. How moral-
ity is cultivated through ritual is arguably best elaborated in the Xunzi, although the ideals and methods are 
arguably also present in the Analects and, to a lesser extent, the Mengzi.13 As such, I will draw primarily from 
Xunzi’s writings for the purposes of explanation and argumentation, supplementing with other Confucian 
writings when appropriate.
To begin, an overarching aim of Confucian moral cultivation is harmony (he 和),14 which is to be 
achieved at both the inter- and intrapersonal levels. Interpersonally, the structure that ritual provides 
enables a community of mutual respect and consideration among members. This is the case despite the 
hierarchical nature of relationships in the Confucian tradition, with Xunzi asserting that “there is to 
be respect for one and all.”15 Accordingly, even in hierarchical relationships, all parties involved should 
maintain a relevant respectful attitude (e.g., children owe parents filiality, while parents owe children 
loving kindness).16 Thus, ritual maintains interpersonal harmony by helping to outline, actualize, and 
maintain a community of respect.
Ritual also engenders intrapersonal harmony. Ritual is not only a means of harmonizing society, but 
also the individual.17 In particular, it helps humans to understand, organize, cope with, and transform 
their (sometimes chaotic) dispositions.18 This is perhaps most notable in Xunzi’s discussion of the impor-
tance of mourning rituals and sacrifices of remembrance. Xunzi states: “Ordinarily in funeral rites, one 
gradually alters the corpse’s appearance and changes its ornamentation, moves it farther away, and over 
time returns to peaceful living.”19 Just as there is a desire to mourn for those one loves, so too is there a 
desire (or at least a practical need) to return to functional living. Ritual invites the practitioner to recog-
nize a transition not only of life into death, but also between having a person actively in one’s life and not. 
Ideally, ritual helps the mourner not only to fully embrace and express grief, but also to reorient to and 
carry on in a world in which a loved one no longer lives. This is achieved by giving a means of mediat-
ing between one’s internal feelings and external, social world: ritual helps to structure one’s thoughts and 
feelings about death and loss.
Of course, it is limiting to think of ritual as being solely about coping with grief. Rather, ritual is con-
cerned with the expression and management of feelings and dispositions in general. When Xunzi is discuss-
ing the idealization of ritual enactment, for example, he speaks of feelings broadly rather than in reference 
10 E.g. Xunzi 9/39/15–16; 19/90/3–5; 27/127/22.
11 I should clarify that by ‘respect and related dispositions’ I include attitudes, traits, etc., that are generally prosocial 
or humanitarian in nature, acknowledging that respect alone may not be a sufficient focus. Respect is, however, a prominent 
disposition in this category due (ideally) to its facilitation of prosocial interactions and relationships among members of even large-
scale communities. As I elaborate later, respect itself likely also admits of genres (see, for example, Robin S. Dillon, “Respect”, in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Univ., 2018)). While different, these 
forms of respect are plausibly complementary of one another in this overarching pursuit of harmony and flourishing.
12 For an expansion of this view, see Colin J. Lewis, “Ritual Education and Moral Development: A Comparison of Xunzi and 
Vygotsky”, Dao 17, no. 1 (2018). Additional recent work on the nature of ritual in early Confucianism can be found in Thomas 
Radice, “Li (Ritual) in Early Confucianism”, Philosophy Compass 12, no. 10 (2017).
13 Despite being one of the three most influential pre-Qin Confucian thinkers, Mengzi says relatively little on ritual. In 
contrast, ritual features prominently in both Kongzi/Confucius’s Analects and Xunzi’s eponymous text.
14 Analects 1.12/2/6–7.
15 Xunzi 13/65/18.
16 See also Xunzi 27/127/15: As for “proper conduct,” it means conducting ritual. As for ritual, through it those who are noble 
are treated with respect. Through it those who are elderly are treated with filiality. Through it those who are senior are treated 
with fraternal respect. Through it those who are young are treated with kindness. Through it those who are lowly are treated with 
generosity, Eric L. Hutton, Xunzi: The complete text (Princeton Univ. Press, 2014), 291.
17 I do not have the space to elaborate this view here. For a more detailed expansion, see Lewis, “Ritual Education and Moral 
Development: A Comparison of Xunzi and Vygotsky”.
18 Xunzi 19/90/3–5; 23/113/11–13.
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to specific states.20 This suggests that rituals are intended to access, cope with, and utilize all sorts of feelings. 
As such, ritual allows individuals to reconcile and regulate their various states, ideally achieving a kind of 
harmony.
WHY BOTHER WITH RITUAL?
One might wonder how rituals can improve extant, modern programs in moral education. If moral edu-
cation programs currently on offer can yield their target benefits, then why bother adding to something 
that is already doing well? I have two initial responses to this sort of question. First, although some moral 
education pursuits have demonstrated (at least initial, marginal) success, such findings are not universal. 
Character-education-based programs, arguably the most popular form of moral education in the U.S. at 
present, have been criticized for a lack of theoretical consistency or objectivity in structure (e.g., Lem-
ing 1993; Was, Woltz, and Drew 2006), an underdetermined philosophical account of what constitutes 
morality or “goodness” (Geren 2001; Kohn 1997), and insufficient data to support the claim that such 
programs reliably produce promoral attitudes and tendencies among participants (e.g., Davis 2003; Hel-
wig, Turiel, and Nucci 1997). Perhaps most damningly, a 2010 report from the Institute of Education 
Sciences evaluated seven different U.S.-based social- and character-development programs over a period 
of three years (2004–2007), only to find that there was no evidence that participants demonstrated any 
improvement in moral or prosocial development when compared with their nonparticipating peers.21 
While these criticisms are limited in scope, they do suggest that additional work is necessary if there is to 
be serious development of moral education programs.
Second, even if there are functional moral education programs, they can still be improved, and there 
is reason to think that ritual can do just that. For example, findings from a study conducted by Leanne 
Beaudoin-Ryan and Susan Goldin-Meadow implicate a relationship between the use of gesture22 and 
the development of perspective-taking in children. In the study, subjects were placed into three groups 
(pro-gesture, anti-gesture, and neutral), exposed to a series of moral dilemmas, and asked to develop 
hypothetical resolutions to each. Interestingly, those subjects encouraged to gesture more reliably dem-
onstrated multiple perspectives with a plurality of resolutions; equally interesting is the fact that those 
prohibited from gesturing displayed a diminished ability for perspective-taking.23 This is good news for 
ritual given its emphasis on bodily performance: rituals often require practitioners to engage in full-body 
activities as part of the way in which they construct, convey, and inculcate their (moral) meanings.
Still, this does not clarify why ritual, let alone a Confucian notion of ritual in particular, is a worth-
while resource for moral education. One reason to consider ritual, I suggest, is its prevalence: even when 
overlooked, unappreciated, and untheorized, ritual remains present in a culture. Greetings are exemplary 
of this, as many cultures employ them but do not emphasize any specific form. In the case of U.S. public 
schools, ritual is not currently a focus,24 but the school itself is nonetheless a ritualized space. Conse-
quently, though one might anticipate that introducing ritual as a resource for moral cultivation would 
necessitate a radical overhaul of relevant programs, if extant school rituals (and ritual-like practices) 
were properly recruited, then the process of making ritual a focus of moral education (i.e., integrating 
something like a Confucian ritual method) would be eased. In order to begin planning for how to in-
20 E.g., Xunzi 19/92/21–19/93/1.
21 Allen Ruby and Emily Doolittle, “Efficacy of Schoolwide Programs to Promote Social and Character Development and 
Reduce Problem Behavior in Elementary School Children.”, National Center for Education Research (2010).
22 Leanne Beaudoin‐Ryan and Susan Goldin‐Meadow, “Teaching moral reasoning through gesture”, Developmental Science 
17, no. 6 (2014) depict gesture simply as “the hand movements spontaneously produced while talking” (985). I would add that 
gesture might extend to other physicalizations of the body as well, such as nods, postural shifts, and facial manipulation, though 
the relevant study does not cover such movements.
23 Beaudoin‐Ryan and Goldin‐Meadow, “Teaching moral reasoning through gesture”, 5.
24 Schools with religious leanings may incorporate rituals into curricula, but these are often religious rituals and may not be 
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stitutionalize ritual for the purpose of moral education, it will help to examine how U.S. classrooms are 
ritualized (both in degree and manner), and whether increased ritualization can help moral education.
Admittedly, determining degree of ritualization poses a difficulty: one cannot measure how ritual-
ized a classroom is in the same way that one can check its temperature. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
investigate whether ritual is at least present in the classroom. In a critique of the modern instrumentali-
zation and bureaucratization of education, Bernstein, Elvin, and Peters note that a post-industrialization 
shift toward the socioeconomic function of schools (i.e., focusing on proficiency and occupational devel-
opment) has led away from schools’ “expressive culture” involving both ritualization of the educational 
space and the internalization of the values shared within the school community.25 Their thesis is that 
ritual performs an integral function by helping to structure the educational environment in a manner 
that enables the transmission of the aforementioned values and helps to build consensus within the 
community.26 Rituals such as assemblies, uniform dress, and pledges all contribute to such ends by pro-
viding the community’s constituents with largely invariant practices that embody and express values. 
On the view of Bernstein et. al, when shifting focus away from such community-building and toward a 
proficiency-oriented, instrumentalist view of education, the utility of ritual is lessened, and its presence is 
reduced accordingly. While this shift can lead to a reduction in (sometimes problematic) stratification of 
the school setting, it also demotes the importance of value-internalization and consensus-creation in the 
community. The implication is that, while it is important to be wary of the nature of social control that 
ritual exerts, rituals should be emphasized in schools for their prosocial, promoral functionality.
More recently, Richard Quantz and his collaborators have examined the presence of ritual in class-
rooms and its applicability in improving extant pedagogy.27 While acknowledging grand rituals like as-
semblies, Quantz’s work focuses on “small” rituals, such as simple and mundane classroom procedures 
including the use of hand-raising, that help coordinate daily life at the school.28 Quantz regards ritual as 
an even more pervasive phenomenon throughout daily experience and, accordingly, even more poten-
tially influential for inculcating social values. In particular, Quantz suggests that ritual analysis can help 
to “find and illuminate the way in which material power is institutionalized into non-rational practices 
of our schools and lead us to replace them with new practices designed to celebrate democracy and 
justice.”29 The upshot here is that rituals help to cultivate a fully educative environment, one that involves 
both rational and non-rational aspects of growth and development, as well as encouraging more en-
gaged, meaningful interactions between students and instructors.
Consistent throughout these commentaries is the claim that ritual has been largely overlooked as a 
resource for pedagogical training.30 This claim’s force is partly derived from a dearth of actual studies on 
classroom rituals: most writing on ritual in the classroom takes place at the theoretical level and does 
not examine whether or how rituals are applied as part of teachers’ pedagogies. Studies that do examine 
application of ritual are frequently small scale and anecdotal (e.g., Ensign 1997, McCadden 1997, Arslan 
25 B. Bernstein, H. L. Elvin, and R. S. Peters, “A Discussion on Ritualization of Behaviour in Animals and Man”, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 251, no. 772 (1966).
26 Admittedly, this study does not explicitly adopt a conception of ritual that is wholly congruent with the Confucian account 
that I advance. Nonetheless, given what Bernstein, Elvin, and Peters take some of the core sociomoral aims of ritual to be, I 
submit that their conception is at least relevantly similar for comparative purposes. The same applies to most other research on 
school rituals detailed herein.
27 Similar sentiments are offered by Bryan R. Warnick, “Ritual, Imitation and Education in R. S. Peters”, Journal of Philosophy 
of Education 43, no. s1 (2009), who suggests that there might be ways in which ritual could be integrated into the classroom 
setting to make it compatible with a liberal education.
28 Richard Quantz, Terry O’Connor, and Peter M. Magolda, Rituals and Student Identity in Education: Ritual Critique for a 
New Pedagogy (Springer, 2011), 3-74.
29 Quantz, O’Connor, and Magolda, Rituals and Student Identity in Education: Ritual Critique for a New Pedagogy, 19.
30 This is not to suggest that educational theorists have no interest in at least concepts/values related to ritual (e.g., as in 
the case of literature on classroom management). See, for example, Catherine Cornbleth, “Ritual and Rationality in Teacher 
Education Reform”, Educational Researcher 15, no. 4 (1986) on teacher education reform, Mary Bushnell, “Small School Ritual 
and Parent Involvement”, The Urban Review 29, no. 4 (1997) on parental involvement, and Frances L. van Voorhis, “Reflecting 
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and Saridede 2012); accordingly, while interesting, they lack rigor and, consequently, generalizing based 
on them would be dubious.
Moreover, and more important for the present project, these commentaries and studies often fail to 
specify what educators and education specialists take ritual to be; the term seems to be applied inconsist-
ently. Brian Gatens, for example, values rituals for their ability to provide structure and reduce anxiety, 
but describes rituals rather reductively as “something we do all the time in the same way — like raising 
a hat in greeting and shaking hands when we meet people.”31 Gatens is no doubt correct that ritual prac-
tices are often formalized and repeated, but the concept of what a ritual is seems at best to be underdevel-
oped. Other education theorists, such as Steve Gruenert and Todd Whittaker, expand the notion of ritual 
by describing it as “stylized public expressions of our values and beliefs,” which they distinguish from 
mere routines that exist solely for the purpose of order and efficiency.32 In order to make progress on the 
question of whether ritual can make a positive and distinctive contribution to moral education, whether 
there is untapped potential in this resource, it is necessary to establish a more precise and consistent no-
tion of what ritual is or involves and how it functions. To this end, I turn to the Confucian ritual model.
THE CONFUCIAN RITUAL MODEL
As noted earlier, for the purposes of this project I understand the Confucian concept of ritual to involve 
the prescriptions for those practices and standards in a community that embody (i.e., give form to) ex-
pressions of respect and related dispositions. With this conception of ritual in hand, I can elaborate the 
Confucian ritual education model and its integral role in moral cultivation.33 According to Xunzi, ritual 
education is primarily a matter of reflective study and practice,34 indicating that moral cultivation via 
ritual is akin to skill development, a feature that aligns with contemporary advocacy for competency-
based learning in building effective curricula.35 Competency is achieved largely by a process of scaffold-
ing, in which the learner’s proximate level of knowledge is built on by gradually introducing new, related 
material. The learner’s competency gradually improves, eventually achieving fluency with the material.36 
In Confucianism, ritual provides a blueprint for what actions to perform in a given situation, giving nor-
mative guidance and a means of connecting appropriate actions with relevant feelings.
In this way, Confucian ritual is a means of establishing actions that are symbolic of certain emotions 
and dispositions: to perform a ritual genuinely, one must express the relevant emotion; to express the rel-
evant emotion, one must actively possess said emotion (and ideally, one will also be receptive to others’ 
ritual actions). A similar point is made by Karen Stohr, who notes that social conventions (e.g., etiquette) 
are the primary vehicles by which one expresses promoral sentiments.37 The implication is that being 
a moral person requires one to understand and adopt social conventions as part of the expression and 
exchange of moral sentiments. This is not to suggest that morality is simply conventionalism: as Stohr 
points out, “the conventions are the starting point.... The thought may be what counts, but the vehicle for 
31 Brian Gatens, Classrooms Need Rituals and Routines — But Don’t Get Carried Away (2016) Room 241: A Blog by Concordia 
Univ.-Portland, 18 July 2016.
32 Steve Gruenert and Todd Whitaker, School Culture Rewired: How to Define, Assess, and Transform It (Association for 
Supervision and Curriculum Development, 2015), 34.
33 Further elaboration of such a ritual model can be found in Colin J. Lewis, “Xunzi’s Ritual Program as a Response to Han 
Feizi’s Criticism of Confucianism”, Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture 34, no. 0 (2020), with a specific focus on how a 
ritual model of moral cultivation can respond to critiques of virtue ethics centered on role modelling.
34 Consider the examples given in Xunzi Book 21, “Undoing Fixation.”
35 For an overview of competency-based learning, see J. Gervais, “The operational definition of competency-based education”, 
The Journal of Competency-Based Education 1, no. 2 (2016).
36 For other recent discussion of ritual and moral fluency, see Michael D. K. Ing, The Dysfunction of Ritual in Early Confucianism 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).
37 Karen Stohr, “Manners, Morals, and Practical Wisdom”, in Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics: 
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expressing it is itself part of the thought.”38 These conventions are integral to proper moral practice and 
serve an important role in coordinating affect and action.
Additionally, ritual can be understood as introducing moral vocabulary units in a manner func-
tionally akin to Ronald de Sousa’s paradigm scenarios. Paradigm scenarios are the means by which hu-
mans are acquainted with and habituated to something like a vocabulary of emotion. They contain two 
components: (1) situation-type and (2) a set of “normal” responses, “where normality is first a biologi-
cal matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one.”39 The idea is that humans have a variety of 
instinctive responses that, via socialization, are shaped to be employed in the expression of promoral 
emotions. Through stories and habituating situations, such as reading morally charged fables to children 
or learning to use a smile to elicit a desired response,40 humans learn to react to a given situation by chan-
neling emotional responses in a manner that is conducive to conventional norms of propriety. A given 
emotional response to a scenario or stimulus (e.g., feeling sympathy for an injured person) is linked to 
cultural norms (e.g., the act of assisting that person).41 Ritual education pursues this goal: one acquires a 
repertoire of ritual to help one understand how to behave in a given situation. Doing so provides a better 
idea of how to relate to others and how best to respond to, and sympathize with, them. As a result, one 
learns how to properly care for others, which is central to the Confucian ideal of humaneness (ren 仁).
Ritual can also enhance moral imagination: the capacity of an individual to visualize (or at least 
hypothesize) about morally charged scenarios.42 Martha Nussbaum has repeatedly emphasized the im-
portance of this capacity as part of her view of morality as a practical (as opposed to merely theoretical 
or rational) enterprise.43 Nussbaum, drawing on the literary philosophy of Henry James, suggests that 
moral knowledge is 
not simply intellectual grasp of propositions…it is perception. It is seeing a complex, concrete reality in a 
highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling.44
The moral imagination, then, undergirds an ability not only to think morally, but to perceive the morally 
salient features of situations. The images and ideas produced and contemplated in this imagination are not 
general and abstract, but specific and concrete. These features, according to Nussbaum, facilitate the devel-
opment of the overarching moral capacity to be capable of going beyond mere rule-following and engage 
in genuine moral performance and improvisation.45 In turn, the moral imagination helps provide the ap-
propriate actions to undertake in response to them on both emotional and rational levels.
Along with literature (e.g., the Odes), the Confucians offer ritual as a plausible candidate for such 
a tool that makes use of and conjoins various metacognitive capacities. Consider the following passage 
from the Xunzi: “[In making offerings to the deceased,] one uses the semblance of moving house, but 
makes clear that the things will not be used, and these are all means by which to heighten sorrow.”46 
Employing such imaginative capacity aids the coping process: the use of symbolic, nonfunctional tools 
38 Ibid., 195.
39 Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (MIT Press, 1990), 182. De Sousa seems to intend “normal” in the sense of 
statistical norms.
40 Similar ideas are presented by Daniel N. Stern, The First Relationship (Harvard Univ. Press, 2009), 13–14, 25–27.
41 An anonymous reviewer suggests that such functions or features are exclusive to a Mengzian view of ritual, but we should 
reject this reading. There is a clearly established relationship between the inculcation of attitudes and ritual prescriptions across 
the attributed works of at least the pre-Qin thinkers. Even Xunzi, sometimes mistakenly identified as holding a Hobbesian 
motivational view, notes ritual’s role in facilitating the cultivation and deployment of feelings (e.g., 19/92/3–4 and 19/94/14–18; 
for examples of non-self-interested motives, see 19/96/10–13 as well as Eric Hutton, “Does Xunzi have a consistent theory of 
human nature?”, Virtue, nature, and moral agency in the Xunzi (2000), and so I see no reason to treat this as an exclusively 
Mengzian feature of ritual.
42 I will not address the question of whether the moral imagination is a distinct capacity from other varieties of imagination, 
though there is at least some reason to suspect that it is not, Gregory Currie, “The moral psychology of fiction”, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 2 (1995).
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to represent actual, functional tools requires one to utilize a sort of nonliteral thinking in caring for the 
dead, similar to what is seen in pretend play; special meditative thought combined with fasting might be 
another means of altering one’s psychology such that it is easier to engage with feelings and memories 
about lost loved ones.47
Relatedly, ritual facilitates development of an awareness of other minds by creating a system for shar-
ing an understanding of emotions and attitudes between individuals. In “Against Physiognomy,” Xunzi 
asserts that another’s intentions, motives, and affective states are what should be of primary concern 
when evaluating that person’s moral goodness.48 Ritual provides practitioners with a means of “reading” 
the minds of others and, insofar as this is an intended purpose of the ritual, it presupposes that such 
minds exist. This means of assessing via ritual is possible because ritual is a medium for much of hu-
man moral interaction. It fills a much-needed role by augmenting the human capacity to relate to others 
on multiple levels, including an affective level. It is plausible, then, that ritual education entails learners 
developing awareness of the thoughts and feelings of others in order to comprehend and deploy ritual.
To summarize: the ritual education method includes emphases on inculcating moral fluency via 
symbolic practices and distinctions, training and appropriately associating promoral dispositions, en-
hancing moral imagination, and developing awareness of other minds. The model is thus a multifaceted 
approach to moral education through (meta)cognitive development.
DO THE DATA SUPPORT RITUAL?
If ritual is to be seriously considered as a tool for moral education, then it will help to provide evidence of 
its being a worthwhile investment. To start, there is at least tentative support for the claim that ritual can 
aid inculcation of sympathy and empathy. As I have argued, ritual can facilitate such developments by 
providing an effective means of sharing emotions and attitudes between members of a community.49 Re-
search in early childhood behavior depicts emotional and moral development as related. Kristin Lagat-
tuta and Drika Weller, for example, note that moral development positively correlates with the capacity 
for awareness and understanding of others,50 suggesting that increasing feelings of sympathy or empathy 
can lead to more reliable displays of moral behavior. Given the importance of empathy to the develop-
ment of moral competence, then, it is desirable that a moral education program work on eliciting such 
responses when cued, and the ritual model should be capable of doing so.
Other findings resonate with the Confucian belief that ritual can contribute to cultivating or chan-
neling emotions that encourage promoral behavior. Tina Malti and Sophia Ongley claim that emotions 
play a key role in children’s development by guiding moral decision-making via either anticipating out-
comes of courses of action or providing feedback concurrently.51 Negative consequent emotional out-
comes are incorporated into a child’s memory and, in turn, moral thought process, ultimately discourag-
ing the associated behavior(s). In subsequent, similar interactions, the child anticipates a similar emo-
tional outcome and considers this prior to acting.52 Recall that, for Xunzi, moral cultivation involves 
emotional refinement by providing suitable social forms (i.e., rituals) for the situationally relevant emo-
47 Mark Berkson, “Xunzi as a Theorist and Defender of Ritual”, in Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi, ed. Eric Hutton 
(Springer, 2016).
48 See in particular Xunzi 5/17/11–13: “Physiognomizing a person’s outer form is not as good as judging his heart; judging 
his heart is not as good as ascertaining his chosen course…so long as one’s heart and course are good, it will not obstruct one’s 
becoming a gentleman. Even if one’s outer form is good, if one’s heart and chosen course are bad, then it will not obstruct one’s 
becoming a petty person.” Hutton, Xunzi: The complete text, 32.
49 E.g., Analects 10.25/25/24: Upon seeing someone in mourning garb, even if it was a mere acquaintance, he would alter his 
countenance [to one of reverence].
50 Kristin Lagattuta and Drika Weller, “Interrelations Between Theory of Mind and Morality”, in Handbook of Moral 
Development, ed. Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana (Psychology Press, 2014), 387, 390, 399–400.
51 Tina Malti and Sophia Ongley, “The Development of Moral Emotions and Moral Reasoning”, in Handbook of Moral 
Development, ed. Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana (Psychology Press, 2014), 167–68.
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tions. The result is that particular emotions come to be associated with specific circumstances and moral 
understandings. That an associative feedback loop of emotion and experience appears to occur in devel-
opment also implies that the ritual model can realistically contribute to moral education.
Another empirically supported aspect of ritual is its usefulness as a concrete resource for the purpose 
of education. The Confucians seem to assume that humans tend to best understand morality by piecing 
together actual, emotionally accessible examples of behavior and then forming principles to make coher-
ent patterns out of said behaviors.53 Xunzi, for example, indicates awareness of such facts when discuss-
ing how, in attempting to debate with and educate others, one should utilize examples that are both fit-
ting to a situation and accessible to one’s audience: if learners cannot relate to the cases being discussed, 
let alone access them in a useful way, then the educational pursuit is a nonstarter.54 Against the backdrop 
of empirical findings, these features of ritual suggest that it would be highly efficacious for moral educa-
tion. As noted by Wainryb, Brehl, and Matwin, when confronting morally charged scenarios in which 
they had participated, subjects between five and sixteen years of age constructed their reports in man-
ners that showed greater awareness of the mental states of their co-participants compared to reports in 
which subjects were asked about hypothetical cases.55 This suggests—in support of the Confucian ritual 
model—that when recollecting specific, personal experiences, humans are more prone to engaging their 
own emotions in their moral reasoning and also taking into account the emotions of others than when 
asked to reason at the more abstract level of hypotheticals.
Finally, and more speculatively, ritual and its emphasis on respect may have further implications 
for cultivating additional metacognitive functions. In a recent exploration of how to improve appeals to 
critical thinking skills in the context of moral education, Duck-Joo Kwak offers the following insight, ty-
ing critical thinking to ethical reflection:
Ethical reflection on our own practice does not merely require self-examination of our motives, but also 
needs to involve theoretical understanding of other kinds to be able to explain how and why a certain 
practice was derived, how it has shaped our experiences, and in what way our beliefs and desires are 
connected to it…[E]xplanatory criticism would create in us a highly self-conscious awareness of what 
we are doing, including the consideration that we cannot be fully free from the practice. … [E]thical 
reflection…can bring to our students the learned ownership of their moral beliefs along with a broader 
understanding of their ethical practice based upon them—namely, the possibilities and limitations of the 
practice.56
Ritual study and practice (at least as envisioned by the Confucians) require reflection on the part of the 
learner.57 If this connection is correct, then cultivating respect may also enhance other capacities such as 
sensitivities to morally salient features of situations and other minds, as well as a more general capacity for 
53 A similar point is made by Amy Olberding, “Dreaming of the Duke of Zhou: Exemplarism and the Analects”, Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 35, no. 4 (2008), who discusses “exemplarism” in the Confucian tradition. According to Olberding, appeal to 
particular individuals (e.g., sages, Kongzi, Yan Hui etc.) is intended to direct readers not merely to illustrations of ideal behavior, 
but to exemplars who are the “genesis” of the more abstract ethical concepts in Confucianism. This idea garners additional sup-
port from Xunzi’s explicit treatment of the origin of ritual and yi as being a product of the behavior of the sage kings, rather than 
something extant independent of human artifice.
54 Xunzi 5/19/17–5/20/1.
55 Cecilia Wainryb et al., “Being Hurt and Hurting Others: Children’s Narrative Accounts and Moral Judgments of Their Own 
Interpersonal Conflicts”, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 70, no. 3 (2005).
56 Duck-Joo Kwak, “Re‐conceptualizing Critical Thinking for Moral Education in Culturally Plural Societies”, Educational 
Philosophy and Theory 39, no. 4 (2007): 469.
57 Indeed, the Korean Neo-Confucian philosopher Yi Hwang (known also by his pen name, Toegye) not only emphasizes 
respect as a central value for sagely cultivation (as in his Ten Diagrams), but also regards it as something like mindfulness: a 
concentrated awareness that ties together both the theoretical and practical aspects of moral goodness. For recent elaborations 
of this position see Michael C. Kalton, “Toegye: His Life, Learning and Times”, in Dao Companion to Korean Confucian 
Philosophy, ed. Young-chan Ro (Springer Netherlands, 2019), Hyoungchan. Kim, “Toegye’s Philosophy as Practical Ethics: A 
System of Learning, Cultivation, and Practice for Being Human”, Korea Journal 47, no. 3 (2007), Uchang Kim, “Confucianism, 
democracy, and the individual in Korean modernization”, in Transformations in Twentieth Century Korea, ed. Yun-shik Chang 
and Steven Lee (Routledge, 2006), and Diana Yuksel, “Korean Confucian Moral Self-accomplishment and Postmodern Ethics”, 
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reliable moral judgement. Consequently, ritual practice might even be relevant for the development of criti-
cal thinking in the context of ethical reflection.
BUILDING RITUALIZED MORAL CURRICULA
There is, then, at least tentative reason to think that ritual can enhance moral development. How, though, 
can ritual like that of the Confucians be incorporated into modern moral education programs? 58 It is not 
clear that contemporary humans can, or should, attempt to follow the exact rituals in the exact manner 
that Confucians like Xunzi prescribe; indeed, it is not even clear what such rituals would entail. Instead, 
to harness the psychosocial benefits of ritual, I advocate looking at the more general concept of ritual as it 
has been depicted thus far and address how best to institutionalize it for a contemporary school setting.59 
Consequently, even if we do jettison some Confucian features, the Confucian conception of ritual and the 
model of education just described still hold merit for their ability to inculcate and help deploy promoral 
dispositions.
As mentioned earlier, that others have previously advocated introducing or emphasizing ritual (in 
some form) for the classroom is encouraging, since it implies that the integration of ritual into moral 
education practices is feasible and perhaps even desirable. Nonetheless, extant research does not answer 
the question of how to institutionalize and deploy ritual. Ideally, future studies on classroom ritualiza-
tion should: (a) establish a common understanding of ritual, as well as how to identify instances of it; 
(b) formalize a methodology for data collection, preferably beyond anecdotal reports; and (c) encourage 
collaboration among a more diverse collection and larger number of classrooms and institutions. I have 
provided, at least partly, a working definition of ritual in the relevant sense, namely “the prescriptions for 
those practices and standards in a community that embody (i.e., give form to) expressions of respect and 
related dispositions.” Researching the presence of these sorts of prescriptions would facilitate searches for 
patterns of ritual that emerge in classroom settings, as well as the diversity of rituals involved and how 
or whether said diversity relates to other features of the classroom (e.g., student demographics, class size, 
subject matter, etc.). Such data would provide a more objective and useful look at how ritual is or is not 
being employed in classrooms and, consequently, would aid subsequent determinations how to further 
institutionalize ritual for the specific purpose of moral education.
While this empirical project must be left for future research, it is still possible to engage the important 
task of selecting or designing the rituals for moral education programs. Before proceeding too far along 
this line, I should point out that the latter option (i.e., designing wholly new rituals) is probably largely 
unnecessary. While it is certainly possible to design new rituals for moral education,60 there is no need 
to do so when there are already extant rituals or conventions that could be reframed as educational ritu-
als. Almost all communities have patterns of practices used for organizational purposes, so the key is to 
integrate the practices and the target moral content that are to be internalized by learners; this is ritual-
ization. When rituals are inculcated effectively, learners do not simply perform a certain practice because 
it is customary or orderly; they do so out of something like respect or a more general sense of morality.61 
58 Robert C. Neville, Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context (SUNY Press, 2008) asks a 
similar question regarding modernizing Confucian ritual for moral education.
59 A separate issue regards moral education in non-school contexts. Due to the constraints of space, I cannot address such 
domains, but more can (and should) be said regarding both moral education and ritual outside of the school.
60 In point of fact, as of 2015, Stanford’s Institute of Design launched under the guidance of Kursat Ozenc and Margaret 
Hagan, “Ritual Design Lab | Bringing meaning into experience & service design”, last modified April 3, 2021:36:50, https://
www.ritualdesignlab.org/, with an aim of using rituals to “help people to make sense of their life-stages, to construct meaning at 
personal and societal levels, and to color their rather uneventful ordinary lives.” While the Ritual Design Lab is not specifically 
geared at moral education, its existence suggests that generating new rituals is a live interest and that such projects may be 
applicable to moral education pursuits.
61 A relevant parallel may be the distinction between harmony/harmonizing (he 和) and merely agreeing or following along 
(tong 同) as it appears in the Analects (i.e., 13.24/36/11: “the noble person harmonizes and does not merely agree; the petty 
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Consider the practice of raising a hand to request an opportunity to speak in a classroom setting: this 
practice is a common convention, but it is also an important ritual in helping to establish a dynamic of re-
spectful interactions between teachers and students in the space of the school. If such cultivation through 
practice proves to be an effective means of encouraging the respectful dynamic and, in turn, prosocial, 
promoral behavior in general, then it could be said that such an existing convention has been successfully 
recruited into the moral education process as a ritual.
Furthermore, presumably it is desirable that rituals utilized in the context of the classroom be contin-
uous with general social practices to ensure the transferability of moral education. As discussed earlier, 
many cultures and communities already possess a variety of rituals, at least some of which fit the defini-
tion to which I have been appealing throughout the essay. If ritual is as important for the perpetuation 
and maintenance of (pro)moral dispositions within a community as I have postulated, then unless there 
exists a community in which members are completely incapable of consistently expressing respect and 
humanitarian dispositions through a shared collection of behaviors, there is reason to be skeptical of the 
need for completely new rituals. One of the issues I noted, however, is that sometimes rituals are not focal 
points of the culture in general, let alone moral education curricula in particular. Bringing such rituals 
to the forefront could augment moral education programs with additional resources for inculcating pro-
moral dispositions in students that will also be applicable throughout the general community. It might 
be necessary to slightly modify the rituals for the sake of making them more salient within the program, 
but generating all new rituals seems both unnecessary and potentially counterproductive.
Having said this, I do not mean to imply that there can be no modification of extant ritual; indeed, 
any programmatic development will involve at least some degree of innovation. Rather, I recommend 
appropriating extant rituals and practices, and incorporating them into a more ritualized approach to 
moral education (i.e. the ritual education model). This resonates with the aforementioned line of think-
ing adopted by Gruenert and Whitaker, who note the ability to transform mere routines into meaningful, 
value-laden rituals that help to bond the school community together. Such observations have influenced 
proposals for how to improve extant school culture, one recent example being the work of Sam Redding 
and Julie Corbett, who note that identifying, understanding, and engaging extant rituals in the school 
are all integral procedures for shifting the overall school culture to promote social and academic growth 
for constituents.62
If one hopes to draw on extant rituals, then, how ought one to select them? To begin, I suggest first 
returning to the specific notion of ritual with which I am operating: the prescriptions for those practices 
and standards in a community that embody expressions of respect and related dispositions. Keeping this 
in mind will help in delineating the rituals that are relevant to moral education from those that are not 
(e.g., a practice of turning lights on and off due to compulsive tendencies). Using this account of ritual 
as a metric, and via collaboration with experts in other fields (e.g., psychology, sociology, and anthropol-
ogy), is the beginning of identifying the rituals (or at least classes of rituals) with which to populate moral 
education programs.
Additionally, when choosing and establishing rituals to morally educate, it must be remembered that 
this curriculum is not merely a matter of habituating behaviors, but also cultivating understanding and 
valuation of certain precepts and ideals. In ritualizing a practice, architects of moral education programs 
must conceptualize and infuse the relevant value(s) or precept(s) into the practice. This means that there 
must be a cognitive or meta-cognitive component of reflection involved in ritual education: as mundane 
practices are transformed into morally laden rituals, learners will need help in grasping the distinction 
between a practice as mere routine and meaningful ritual. Accordingly, learner-practitioners should be 
encouraged to not merely adopt and maintain said ritual (lest it devolve into habit), but also reflect on its 
meaningfulness, including attitudinal content and socio-ethical importance.63 In so doing, one bridges 
62 Sam Redding and Julie Corbett, Shifting School Culture to Spark Rapid Improvement: A Quick Start Guide for Principals and Their 
Teams. (Center on School Turnaround at WestEd, 2018).
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the so-called rational and non-rational, helping learners develop a more complete moral fluency by bind-
ing performance, affect, and understanding with a prosocial, promoral orientation.
These are good first steps toward identifying rituals for integration, but additional filters are still nec-
essary. Although I am deriving my account of ritual from the Confucian notion, I also need to distance 
the account from elements of the very same tradition.64 This is, in part, due to the fact that the Confucian 
tradition (broadly construed) includes a number of sociomoral precepts that may not be desirable for all 
communities,65 but the concern also extends to rituals from any culture or belief set: they may espouse, 
reflect, or represent values or dispositions that are incompatible with idealized moral education programs. 
It is important, therefore, to examine the rituals under consideration based on the values and dispositions 
that one hopes to inculcate.
This is a philosophically interesting issue, especially given this account of ritual’s focus on respect as a 
core disposition of expression and inculcation. Thus far, I have spoken of respect in rather general terms; 
in point of fact, respect admits of a plurality of notions. Consider, for example, the distinction between 
the respect one might hold for a talented artist and a respect for human rights: the first case might be con-
ceived in terms of esteem or admiration, as one is impressed by the artist’s performance or product; the 
second case involves a slightly different attitude, what one might think of as something like approbation, 
as one regards human rights as a policy by which one should abide.66 Variety among kinds of respect is 
also present within the Confucian tradition from which I have abstracted my notion of ritual. As argued 
by Sin-yee Chan, respect in Confucianism (at base) involves acknowledging, valuing, and responding 
accordingly to not only a person’s worth, but also the worth of that person’s projects.67 How that respect 
is conveyed, and its contents, vary depending on features of one’s relationship to others (e.g., respect is 
shown to a parent as filiality, but respect is shown to a sibling as fraternity). Thus, even within a tradition, 
it is possible for respect to admit of a plurality.
On the one hand, this observation about respect is innocuous. That there are varying forms of respect 
does not preclude the possibility of stable, even harmonious communities.68 In fact, different forms of 
respect may even be conducive to such harmony: respect for a superior or instructor simply is different 
from the respect that one shows to a colleague or peer, and maintaining certain boundaries as part of 
demonstrating this respect contributes to maintaining a functional space of practice (be it a classroom, 
office, or even a sporting event). A pluralism about respect, then, is arguably healthy and even necessary, 
and the rituals employed in moral education should be expected to accommodate this pluralism.
On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that certain notions of respect might not be con-
ducive to an ideal system of moral education. In the U.S., for example, moral frameworks are typically 
built around philosophically liberal ideals such as democracy, fairness, and equity. Not all varieties of 
respect, or modes of expressing it, are conducive to such frameworks. In Confucianism, the sometimes 
rigid, hierarchical system of divisions inherent in the notion of ritual utilized by Xunzi might not be 
wholly compatible with liberal, democratic ideals.69 A similar example from Western culture manifests 
64 Indeed, the topic of whether humans could, or should, draw from the particulars of such a tradition has been recently explored 
by Owen Flanagan, “Modern Times and Modern Rites”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32 (2019), particularly with regard to ritual’s 
fit in liberal societies.
65 Confucianism, or at least the cultures with which it has been associated, have garnered attention at various times for 
problematically sexist or xenophobic leanings. For examples of contemporary discussions of these issues, and whether these 
features are essential to Confucianism, see Bryan van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), 330–31 and Feng Zhang, “Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History”, The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (2015).
66 Stephen L. Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect”, Ethics 88, no. 1 (1977) distinguishes these as appraisal respect and recognition 
respect.
67 Sin Y. Chan, “The Confucian Notion of Jing (Respect)”, Philosophy East and West 56, no. 2 (2006), 229.
68 Even varying moral systems need not pose opposition, provided they fall within certain parameters.
69 An anonymous reviewer questions whether such potential incompatibilities undermine the argument I am making for the 
utility of ritual as a resource for moral education. Three points — (1) while I am focusing on the example of liberal democratic 
ideals here, it is not my present aim to advocate or advance liberalism in particular; (2) relatedly, we should be wary of assuming 
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in the notion of chivalry, as well as notions of respect derived from religious laws and customs (e.g., 
halakha, sharia, catechism, etc.). It is not obvious that these notions of respect, and their accompany-
ing rituals, would (or could) fit within the parameters of the liberal framework that a U.S.-based moral 
education program would hope to inculcate.70 This applies not only to notions of respect, but also to the 
promoral values to which said notions attach (e.g., filiality, equity, etc.). Accordingly, rituals will need to 
be selected against a backdrop of agreed upon values that are conducive to a particular moral framework. 
This may require a constrained value pluralism. Developing the constraints for such pluralism, as well as 
examining its applications and ramifications, are both well beyond the bounds of this project. Given the 
importance of such pursuits, however, they should remain additional matters for investigation in future 
research on ritual’s utility for moral education.
Despite the uncertainties posed by these questions, I do not think that they are overly worrisome for 
ritual’s potential as a tool for moral education, especially considering that (in principle) there do not ap-
pear to be any negatives associated with this pursuit. Furthermore, and as I have argued throughout the 
essay, there is good reason to think that ritual can perform a number of functions that make it an ideal 
resource for helping learners to cultivate promoral dispositions. In fact, it is arguable that there is at least 
as much reason to think that ritual can benefit moral education programs as other instructional tools 
(e.g., surveys, clickers, social media, etc.) for general education. The specifics of how to employ ritual 
remain incomplete, but we should be optimistic about ritual’s ability to inculcate morality and continue 
exploring this possibility.
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